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IRA J. KURZBAN: LAWYER AS HERO
IRWIN P. STOTZKY*
Ira Kurzban represents the best of his generation. He has
spent the past fifteen years spearheading the intense legal effort to
revolutionize and reshape immigration law, particularly as applied
to refugees, so that it conforms to our constitutional norms. He has
led the fight to alter fundamentally the Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service's (INS) invidiously discriminatory treatment of Hai-
tian refugees. Ira has been the leader in the battle to make a run-
away government agency adhere to the rule of law. His public life
as an unceasing advocate for the fair treatment of Haitian refugees
makes him a true American hero.
Ira's life as a lawyer has represented a passionate defense of
the ideal that one's business on earth is to discover and do what is
right, and that it is the law's function to help make real this com-
mitment. Certainly this commitment to justice stems from his fam-
ily background-the fact that his father was himself a refugee who
sought freedom from oppression in the United States. But his vi-
sion of law has a great deal to do with the body of constitutional
law created by the Supreme Court in the 1960s and early 1970s.
On many levels-intellectual, political, and social-a previous
generation, to which Ira belongs, came of age in its conception of
the role that law and the judiciary should play in our society dur-
ing the Warren Court era. This era was, of course, the "golden age"
of American law. Indeed, I refer to it as the "golden age" because
the Warren Court represented a unique experiment in judicial
decisjonmaking. It stood for a set of commitments and a vision of
law that grew into a program of revolutionary constitutional re-
form. Brown v. Board of Education,1 for example, undertook the
almost impossible job of making good on America's complex histor-
ical promise of racial equality in all aspects of political and social
life. The Court also brought a modicum of procedural fairness and
equality to the administration of criminal justice in all the states.
* Copyright 1992 Irwin P. Stotzky, Professor of Law, University of Miami School of
Law.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Furthermore, the Court expanded constitutional protections
against state infringements on the most intimate of human rela-
tionships. In pursuit of this vision of law, the Warren Court em-
ployed the Bill of Rights and the Civil War Amendments as the
standard for providing rights and challenging the status quo. This
revolution in judicial conception and role changed the entire set of
relationships between the federal and state governments, as well as
the relationships between the individual and state and federal
governments.
Even with these reforms, however, immigration law remained
isolated from the most fundamental norms of due process and
equal protection, administrative procedure, and judicial role that
define the remainder of our legal system. In the midst of a revolu-
tion in these most basic conceptions of our legal system, immigra-
tion law continued to maintain its stubborn adherence to govern-
ment authority. A number of factors contributed to this dilemma.
Courts viewed immigration law as being an integral part of the
very idea of nationhood. Judges thought, therefore, that any judi-
cial interference with the executive and congressional branches' de-
termination of who may enter and remain in the United States,
and under what conditions, violated the concept of sovereignty.
Moreover, courts viewed foreign policy considerations as being di-
rectly implicated in immigration law. Thus, courts tended to be
more deferential to executive and congressional mandates. Perhaps
more significantly, many Americans view immigrants with suspi-
cion, if not outright hostility. During periods of economic crisis,
therefore, aliens become targets for racial and religious bigotry.
This, in turn, has a serious impact on the interpretation and appli-
cation of immigration laws.
From the late 1970s through the early 1990s, however, civil
rights lawyers filed a series of lawsuits in attempts to transform
this field of law so that the executive branch would conform its
behavior to meet constitutional norms. The influx of approxi-
mately 125,000 Cubans in the 1981 Mariel boatlift, and the
thousands of Haitians fleeing the Duvalier regime and now the mil-
itary coup that ousted President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, are the
driving forces behind this legal assault. These cases forced the INS
to change its illegal treatment of refugees. Ira Kurzban led the
way. He was the lead counsel in almost every significant decision
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affecting refugees from the late 1970s through today.2
Perhaps the most significant case arising out of these develop-
ments is Jean v. Nelson.s Jean involved the influx of Haitians into
south Florida during the early 1980s, most of whom sought politi-
cal asylum. The government adopted a general practice of incarcer-
ating these Haitians in "camps" pending a determination of their
asylum claims, and did not grant their requests to be released tem-
porarily on "parole." In so doing, the government violated several
statutes by not meeting fundamental procedural norms, such as
the basic notice and comment rulemaking requirements of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act (APA).'
Although Congress permitted the Attorney General to incar-
cerate aliens on a non-discriminatory basis pending the determina-
tion of an alien's claim, the statute does not require incarceration.'
Indeed, INS officials did not read the immigration statutes to re-
quire incarceration from 1954 until 1981. Moreover, Congress spe-
cifically provided that excludable aliens could be paroled pending a
determination of their admissibility.' Prior to 1981, the govern-
ment routinely paroled excludable aliens seeking asylum, regard-
less of race or nationality. In 1981, however, the INS continuously
refused to apply Congress's intent to permit temporary release
pending a determination of admissibility to black Haitian refugees.
Nevertheless, INS continued to permit such parole for all other
refugees, including asylum seekers entering Florida from Cuba and
Nicaragua. The Haitian refugees filed suit, alleging, inter alia, that
this detention policy denied them equal protection and other con-
stitutional and statutory guarantees because it discriminated
against them solely on the basis of their national origin and race.
In 1982, the Haitians obtained an injunction releasing them from
incarceration. The injunction further required the INS to establish
and follow rules and regulations which met APA notice and com-
ment requirements. The case nevertheless continued to wind its
way through the courts on a variety of issues for approximately ten
2. Indeed, since 1985, Ira has been the lead counsel for a team of lawyers who have
represented Haitian refugees in front of the United States Supreme Court on four separate
occasions. See Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992); McNary v. Hai-
tian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 888 (1991); Commissioner, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154
(1990); Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
3. 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
4. See 5 U.S.C. § 553.
5. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b).
6. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).
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The Supreme Court eventually ruled that any discrimination
against the Haitians based on race or national origin would be un-
lawful under the applicable immigration statutes and government
regulations. But the Court did not reach the constitutional issues.
In response to this litigation and the loud public outcry that it pro-
duced, Congress eventually enacted new legislation to address
these tragic circumstances. These laws allowed all Haitian refugees
who had reached our shores prior to 1982 to apply for resident sta-
tus and eventually citizenship. These changes in the law can be
attributed directly to the litigation in Jean. Ira Kurzban provided
the leadership for this vital change in the law.
In October 1981, in addition to its new detention policy which
applied only to Haitian refugees, the Reagan Administration
adopted a program of Coast Guard interdiction of boats in waters
between Haiti and the United States. Through this interdiction
policy, the government clearly meant to cut down on the number
of asylum seekers. In November 1991, Haitian refugees filed an-
other lawsuit, claiming illegalities in the implementation of this
policy.7 After a harrowing litigation that produced numerous ap-
peals, the Supreme Court denied petitioner's application for a stay
and its petition for certiorari.' Thousands.of Haitians have thus
been repatriated and face persecution in Haiti.'
7. See Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992).
8. Id.
In a suit raising similar issues, the Second Circuit recently found that the government's
practice, pursuant to a May 1992 Executive Order, of intercepting and automatically repa-
triating Haitian refugees without a hearing or screening violates §243(h) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary 969 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir. 1992),
cert. granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3256 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1992) (No. 92-344). Although the Second Cir-
cuit ordered an injunction to prevent the government from automatically repatriating Hai-
tian refugees, id. at 1367, the Supreme Court has stayed the injunction, 61 U.S.L.W. 3082
(U.S. August 1, 1992) (No. A-82), and granted certiorari. 61 U.S.L.W. 3256 (U.S. Oct. 6,
1992) (No. 92-344).
9. This is another tragic instance in which the Supreme Court has failed to live up to
its constitutional mandate. In my opinion, it is akin to the Court's shameful decision in
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), where, despite the clear violation of per-
sonal liberty, the Supreme Court upheld the War Department's program, enacted following
Pearl Harbor, of exclusion, detention, and physical relocation of persons of Japanese ances-
try residing in an extended area in the western United States. The program did not restrict
itself to enemy aliens, but instead included American citizens of Japanese ancestry who
resided in the particular area determined by the military to be off limits. The governmentjustified the program as a means essential to protect against espionage and sabotage during
this period of World War II. This is the only instance in which the Supreme Court has ever
upheld an explicit racial discrimination after applying strict scrutiny. The case has been
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But surely this is not the end of the struggle. Haitian refugees
continue to leave Haiti in record numbers. The INS continues to
violate the laws. Legal and political efforts will not cease until the
government adheres to the rule of law. Ira Kurzban will certainly
continue to lead the assault against illegal government practices. A
hero is incapable of asking less of himself.
widely described as an immoral blot on our constitutional conscience. It is an example of the
impact that racism may have on our institutional health and national integrity. It is the
accepted wisdom that Korematsu has been overruled by the courts of history. But the re-
cent treatment of Haitian refugees clearly contradicts that conclusion.
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